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Abstract Prospect Theory is widely regarded as the most promising descriptive model for decision mak-
ing under uncertainty. Various tests have corroborated the validity of the characteristic fourfold pattern of risk 
attitudes implied by the combination of probability weighting and value transformation. But is it also safe to 
assume stable Prospect Theory preferences at the individual level? This is not only an empirical but also a con-
ceptual question. Measuring the stability of preferences in a multi-parameter decision model such as Prospect 
Theory is far more complex than evaluating single-parameter models such as Expected Utility Theory under the 
assumption of constant relative risk aversion. There exist considerable interdependencies among parameters 
such that allegedly diverging parameter combinations could in fact produce very similar preference structures. In 
this paper, we provide a theoretic framework for measuring the (temporal) stability of Prospect Theory parame-
ters. To illustrate our methodology, we further apply our approach to 86 subjects for whom we elicit Prospect 
Theory parameters twice, with a time lag of one month. While documenting remarkable stability of parameter 
estimates at the aggregate level, we find that a third of the subjects show significant instability across sessions. 
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1. Introduction 
The question of whether individual risk preferences are a stable individual trait is important for many economic 
decisions. The elicitation of individual risk preference parameters and their utilization for predictive or prescrip-
tive purposes largely rests on the assumption that risk preferences are stable over time. A near-at-hand method 
for analyzing issues of temporal stability is to ask individuals to provide certainty equivalents (CEs) for the 
same lottery at different points in time. If the answers are interpreted in an Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
framework and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is furthermore assumed, the analysis of preference stabil-
ity is straightforward. From each CE an Arrow-Pratt-coefficient of risk aversion can be determined to provide 
simple indicators of risk attitude and to address the question of temporal stability. If the problem is approached 
from a more descriptive point of view and the stability of risk attitudes is discussed in the light of Cumulative 
Prospect Theory,
1
 things become trickier. In Prospect Theory (PT), widely regarded to be the most promising 
descriptive theory of decision making under uncertainty, risk attitudes follow from the shape of the value func-
tion as well as the shape of the probability weighting function and their interaction. A single CE can result from 
an infinite set of curvature and probability weighting parameter combinations. Assuming one-parameter func-
tional specifications for value and weighting function, at least two lotteries are required to separate between 
curvature and probability weighting. Importantly, considerable interdependencies among parameters remain 
even for a large set of carefully chosen lotteries, and minor changes in CEs might lead to sizeable differences in 
the point estimates of the parameters. Against this background it seems important to understand whether differ-
ent parameter combinations resulting from estimation sessions at different points in time actually represent simi-
lar or very distinct risk attitudes. 
The central goal of this paper is to demonstrate the interaction effects among PT parameters and to de-
velop a methodological framework for analyzing the temporal stability of risk attitudes under the notion of PT. 
The framework we introduce sorts out the measurement problems associated with CE stimuli by explicitly ac-
counting for the interaction effects among parameters. To illustrate our methodology, we apply the procedure in 
an experimental study with 86 subjects and present initial evidence on the temporal stability of PT parameter 
estimations. 
The flourishing literature on time stability scrutinizes to what extent individuals respond to risk in an 
intertemporally consistent manner.
2
 To our knowledge, McGlothlin (1956) is the first paper on preference stabil-
ity over time. He analyzes the stability of horse race bettors’ aggregate behavior over the course of a racing day 
and finds a persistent overweighting of small probabilities. Grayson (1960) is the first to analyze temporal sta-
bility at the individual level. He elicits the utility curves of the owner of an oil exploration company before and 
                                                 
1  In the remainder of this text we will omit the “Cumulative” in front of Prospect Theory. 
2  In order to differentiate between time stability and regular/internal consistency in individual decision-making the test-
retest interval is the deciding factor. Studies of time stability use a time lag of at least one month (usually 1–6 months) 
between the first and second run of the elicitation procedure. In contrast, assessments of a subject’s regular consistency 
in decision-making work with shorter test-retest intervals, usually less than one week (we refer to Stott (2006) for an 
overview). Assessments of the internal consistency of decisions work without any time delay. 
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after a three-month interval, and finds greater risk aversion in the later curve. However, the individual was able 
to provide business-related reasons for his temporal instability (change in risk attitude) at the end of the second 
interview session. Swalm (1966) interviews a group of business executives and elicits CEs of hypothetical gam-
bles. He observes a “surprising stability” of the resulting corporate utility curves based on unreported data which 
he had collected. 
But how does research on time stability fit into the broader picture? To identify related fields of re-
search, another look at the history of the field proves to be useful. The starting point for today’s work on prefe-
rence stability, the early psychological literature on intertask consistency, is discussed by Slovic (1972). He 
observes a rapid decline in correlations between risk-taking measures (none of them utility-based) as their struc-
tural similarity decreases. The literature on preference stability strives to identify the determinants of this, at a 
first glance, unsatisfactory finding. A large part of the recent literature can be categorized in two dimensions: 
stability type (stability across domains, stability across elicitation methods, and stability over time) and meas-
ure/theory (survey questions, EUT, and PT). As can be seen from Table 1 there is – up to now – almost a com-
plete lack of literature on time stability under PT. The only paper we know of that looks at time stability from a 
Prospect Theory angle is the recent work by Baucells and Villasís (2010). Their analysis is, however, restricted 
to the question whether the reflection effect can be observed in simple lottery choices and whether this effect is 
stable over time (more about this paper in Section 2). The lack of more general examinations of the stability of 
PT preferences is not overly surprising. The analysis turns out to be complicated from a conceptual point of 
view. With our work we try to shed light on some of the issues. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on prefe-
rence stability over time. Section 3 is the most relevant part as it elaborates on the mechanics of the interaction 
effects within PT preferences and thus provides the theoretical background for the experimental analysis. Sec-
tion 4 presents the design of the experimental study that we have run to illustrate the newly developed metho-
dology of PT time stability analysis. In Section 5, we investigate the time stability of PT risk preferences based 
on the experimental data. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of practical implications and highlights areas of 
future research. 
2. Literature on Time Stability 
We restrict our literature review to the “stability over time” row of Table 1. First, we will consider studies using 
survey questions, move on to EUT, and finish with PT-related work on time stability. There has been a recent 
trend to investigate questions of long-term preference stability with panel-study data from the field (Brunner-
meier and Nagel 2008, Malmendier and Nagel 2010). This approach is a vital complement to our research. It 
explores the predictability of changes in risk attitudes due to changes in observable exogenous factors, whereas 
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we examine how the temporal stability of risk preferences can be judged in the absence of such exogenous 
shocks. 
Malmendier and Nagel (2010) use Survey of Consumer Finances data from 1964–2004 to investigate 
whether differences in individuals’ experiences of macro-economic shocks affect the willingness to take finan-
cial risks. They document a strong reaction of risk preferences to stock returns and inflation experienced over 
the course of an individual’s life, even after controlling for socio-economic variables. Conversely, Brunnermeier 
and Nagel (2008) find that wealth fluctuations have hardly any influence on the proportion of liquid wealth 
invested in risky assets, suggesting that habits or subsistence levels do not cause individuals’ risk aversion to be 
time-varying.
3
 Their data stems from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1984–2003). Sahm (2007) corrobo-
rates this finding by analyzing Health and Retirement Study (1992–2002) data on hypothetical gambles over 
lifetime income. She observes that risk tolerance differs greatly across individuals, but is relatively stable for a 
particular individual. However, factors such as aging and business cycles can systematically affect an individu-
al’s risk tolerance. Documenting a significant correlation between the survey measure and actual risk taking 
(stock ownership), Sahm is convinced that preferences can be reliably measured at the individual level. 
Although the functional form of PT models usually comes with a larger number of parameters than 
their EUT counterparts, both preference theories try to capture the general risk propensity of an individual. Con-
sequently, evidence of somewhat stable EUT parameter estimates would constitute a solid foundation for any 
research on PT preferences. Wehrung et al. (1984) investigate the stability of CRRA parameters over a one-year 
interval for 90 business executives. The hypothetical investment decisions are geared towards both personal and 
corporate resources. They find a small but highly significant positive correlation ( 36.0 ) for the personal risk 
measures, but no stability for business risk propensity. Smidts (1997) examines the long-run temporal stability 
of risk attitudes of Dutch farmers concerning the market price for potatoes. Subjects are asked to specify certain-
ty equivalents for 50/50 lotteries (midpoint chaining technique). This task is repeated after one year. He ob-
serves an even stronger correlation ( 44.0 ) for the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Harrison 
et al. (2005) test the stability of risk preferences by estimating CRRA coefficients at two distinct points in time 
with the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. Using panel regressions they find no significant differences in risk 
aversion over a time span of five to six months. Andersen et al. (2008) study the temporal stability of 
Holt/Laury-based CRRA coefficient estimates by revisiting subjects at five points in time over a 17-month hori-
zon. The follow-up experiments were conducted with a time lag of 3, 5, 11, and 17 months. They document 
some variation in the elicited coefficients over time, but correlations with the initial experiment of 0.43, 0.46, 
0.58 and 0.34 (all significant at the 5% level) suggest a general tendency of stability. Goldstein et al. (2008) 
measure the consistency of CRRA parameters with a time lag of one year for a highly diversified subject pool. 
Participants use the distribution builder (Sharpe et al. 2000) to generate desired return distributions in a fictitious 
retirement savings scenario. The authors come to relatively similar results; the obtained correlation coefficients 
are even slightly higher than the above reported values. 
                                                 
3  More precisely, the changes in risk aversion are not large enough for individuals to overcome their inertia and adjust the 
asset allocation accordingly. 
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To our knowledge, no prior work has looked directly at the stability of individual preference parame-
ters over time when these are characterized by a PT functional. The work by Baucells and Villasís (2010) on the 
existence and time stability of the reflection effect (risk aversion in the gain domain and risk propensity in the 
loss domain) could be related to PT, because this specific pattern of risk attitude is predicted under standard 
assumptions about the curvature of the PT value function (and when neglecting probability weighting). Howev-
er, the experimental design of Baucells and Villasís (2010) builds on only two lottery choices (one in the gain 
domain and one in the loss domain) at two different points of time. It can thus not deliver more detailed prefe-
rence information than just the general tendency of risk aversion or propensity. Furthermore, the issue of proba-
bility weighting is explicitly blinded out in their work. However, probability weighting and its interaction with 
the PT value function turn out to be highly relevant when measuring PT preferences and their stability in a more 
thorough way. Nevertheless, the study of Baucells and Villasís (2010) delivers the interesting insight that not 
even the general pattern of risk attitudes for gains and losses seems to be particularly robust over time. About 
40% of subjects showed the reflection effect pattern in the first session, and 53% in the second session three 
months later. However, for only 24% was the reflection effect present in both sessions. 
3. Interaction Effects among PT Parameters 
3.1 General Considerations 
Prospect Theory preferences can be measured and elicited in various ways. One important aspect is to decide 
whether a parametric or a non-parametric approach should be taken. The assumption of a specific parameteriza-
tion “confounds the general test of the theory with that of the specific parametric form” (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1992, p. 311). Therefore non-parametric analyses of the various facets of PT preference structures have 
been developed and presented in the recent literature (Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui et al. 2007).
 4
 However, the 
goal of our paper is not to test the validity of general PT preference structures, but to analyze the stability of 
specific PT preferences and to highlight the interaction of the PT components. For this purpose, it seems more 
appropriate to restrict the PT value and probability weighting functions to specific parametric forms and to ana-
lyze the interaction of the limited number of parameters that capture the key ingredients of PT evaluation. This 
holds all the more, as Gonzalez and Wu (1999) have shown that for standard parameterizations of PT – as we 
use them in the following – good parametric fits can be observed both for value and probability weighting func-
tion at the individual level.  
A second important aspect is to decide whether to estimate the PT parameters simultaneously from a 
number of certainty equivalents (CE) or to make use of one of the advanced “chained” elicitation methods  that 
have been developed and that allow an independent elicitation of loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity and 
probability weighting (Abdellaoui et al. 2007, Erner et al. 2010). We decided to choose the former approach. As 
we explain in the following, the analysis of the time stability of PT parameters is strongly driven by the assump-
                                                 
4  Abdellaoui et al. (2008) provide a thorough review of the pros and cons of non-parametric fitting. 
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tions about response errors and the “surprising effects” of such errors on the goodness of fit for seemingly very 
different PT parameter combinations. The symmetry that can be induced by simply collecting CEs for a set of 
carefully designed lotteries allows analyzing the interaction of response errors and parameter estimates in a 
clean way and without too many ad hoc assumptions. For the chained methods the analysis of response error is 
much more complicated and inscrutable and many further assumptions on error calibration and propagation 
would be needed.
5
 In general, one has to decide between the theoretical elegance of an elicitation procedure on 
the one hand and its practical applicability on the other. Blavatskyy (2006) comes to the conclusion that the 
theoretically optimal elicitation procedure uses a non-parametric three-stage design. While theoretically appeal-
ing, such sophisticated elicitation methods show limitations in practice (see e.g. Erner et al. 2010). One crucial 
assumption is, for instance, that the magnitude of the response error is unrelated to the complexity of the expe-
rimental task. 
3.2 PT Decision Maker Providing Perfect Answers 
We start our analysis by considering a PT decision maker who provides CEs for simple lotteries without making 
any response error. We assume that his PT preferences can be described by the functional forms proposed by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992): 
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Other functional forms could have been used for the analysis without major impact on the conceptual approach 
and the results.
6
 
Within this framework diminishing value sensitivity, probability weighting, and loss aversion jointly 
determine the risk attitude of an individual (see, for example, Schmidt and Zank 2008). Importantly, this creates 
interdependencies among the corresponding parameters that are important to take into account when these are 
jointly elicited via CEs.
7
 To illustrate the interdependencies we will use a ),(  coordinate system where each 
point in the coordinate system represents a distinct combination ( for the shape of the value function;   for 
the shape of probability weighting).
8
 Similar to Bleichrodt et al. (2007) we restrict the parameter space to the 
range from 0.20 to 2.00 (for the graphical displays and for optimizing procedures). For any given lottery and 
                                                 
5  See Erner et al. (2010) for a detailed analysis of response error and error propagation in such chained methods. 
6
  For the value function, a two-part power specification is largely undisputed. For probability weighting, tests of various 
functional forms have produced equivocal results (Abdellaoui et al. 2008). To avoid overfitting and due to the general 
noisiness of experimental data, we rely on a one-parameter weighting function to measure time stability (see, for 
example, Wu et al. 2004).  
7 Luce (1999), p. 28; van de Kuilen and Wakker (2009), p. 2; Abdellaoui et al. (2008), p. 30-31, and Gonzalez and Wu 
(1999), p. 157, fn. 11, commented by Stott (2006), p. 21. 
8  For the sake of brevity we restrict all illustrations to the gain domain. Yet, the same reasoning can directly be applied to 
the estimation of   and   based on loss lotteries. 
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(sensibly stated) CE, one can compute a set of parameter combinations that are in line with the observed deci-
sion behavior. In our ),(  coordinate system these combinations form a curved line of a particular shape. If 
we restrict our attention to binary lotteries with the lower outcome fixed at zero, the shapes of these compensa-
tion curves are solely determined by the probabilities of the upper outcome (p). The size x of the non-zero out-
come is not relevant by contrast, because for power value functions CEs are proportional to outcome size as 
shown in Equation 3. 
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For an illustration, assume that a PT decision maker with α = 0.88 and  = 0.61 (these are the median values 
estimated by Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) faces a fifty-fifty gamble for a chance to win 60€ (again fixing the 
non-zero outcome at 0€). According to his parameters, the T/K median decision maker will state a CE of 
22.43€. However, due to the compensating effects between the curvature and the probability weighting function, 
22.43€ is also the CE response of an infinite number of other PT decision makers with different ),(   para-
meters. Figure 1a shows the compensation curve of ),(  combinations leading to the same CE of 22.43€. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In general, for each upper outcome probability, there exists one distinct compensation curve with ),(   com-
binations that lead to the same CE as the true parameter combination. Compensation curves for similar (gain) 
probabilities exhibit a similar shape and reflect the interaction effects between α and  . While it is not surpris-
ing that a combination of two preference parameters 
true
  and 
true
  cannot be deduced from a single indifference 
statement, the particular shape of the compensation curves will prove to be important in the following. Figure 2 
displays respective curves of a T/K median decision maker for gain lotteries with winning probabilities of 20%, 
50%, and 80%. Most importantly, the compensation curves show a relatively similar shape despite the use of 
different probabilities. The true ),(   combination (0.88, 0.61) is placed on each curve and it is the only pa-
rameter combination explaining all indifference statements. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
3.3 PT Decision Maker with Response Error 
The analysis of Section 3.2 assumed the decision maker to be able to state his true CEs without any response 
error. In such a scenario, two lotteries with different gain probabilities are sufficient to elicit the decision mak-
er’s true ),(   parameters. If a larger set of lotteries is used, the unique ),(   combination will just be 
reinforced. When integrating a response error, however, the compensation curves introduced in Section 3.1 
usually do not cross in one point and need to be replaced by a (sensibly chosen) goodness-of-fit measure. For 
this purpose we use maximum likelihood (ML) estimation and analyze how likely the stated CEs are generated 
by various ),(   combinations if an error component is present in the evaluation process. We assume the 
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error term to be normally distributed on the stated CE scale. As the employed set of lotteries has different out-
come sizes we further assume that there is a constant relation c between the size of the error term and lottery i’s 
standard deviation.
9
 If n CEs are elicited, the (log-)likelihood function is thus given for any ),(   combina-
tion as: 
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The ability of each ),(   combination to explain an observed set of CE answers can be illustrated by “(log-) 
likelihood topographies”. To generate the topographies we apply a brute-force approach and estimate the like-
lihood for any ),(   combination on a grid within a sensible range. The restriction of the parameter space to 
the range from 0.20 to 2.00 and a grid size of 0.01 implies the calculation of 181∙181=32,761 likelihoods. High-
er levels in the topography denote better ),(   fits, i.e., a higher likelihood that a specific ),(   combina-
tion has generated the given set of CE responses. Figure 3a illustrates the log-likelihood topography of the T/K 
median decision maker, perfectly reporting his true CEs for gain lotteries with winning probabilities of 20%, 
50%, and 80% when the true CEs are augmented with an error component calibrated to fit our experimental 
data.
10
 Again, a main direction of the interaction effects between   and   is clearly visible. Adjacent to the 
optimal solution of  =0.88/  =0.61, a variety of parameter combinations is able to provide fits that explain 
the decision-making behavior of the T/K median decision maker almost equally well. This insight recommends 
implementing lottery sets with larger ranges of probabilities to achieve a larger variation in the compensation 
curves. Although interaction effects can be partly offset by this approach, sizeable interaction effects remain. 
This holds true even if probabilities range from 1% to 99%, as can be seen in Figure 3b where a log-likelihood 
topography is plotted for the extensive set of 28 lotteries used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). These flat 
(likelihood) maxima not only impede the estimation of PT parameters at a single point in time but also necessi-
tate a joint analysis of   and   for measuring PT time stability. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
3.4 The Time Stability of PT Preferences 
As we have seen, interaction effects between value function and probability weighting function are systematic. 
Hence, if we elicit PT preferences at two different points in time, a decision maker can exhibit nearly time-
stable preferences if his point estimates for   and   move alongside the main direction of compensation. 
Therefore an isolated analysis of   and   would prove to be highly error-prone. For a joint analysis of the 
temporal stability of value and probability weighting function parameters, we have to use the information about 
                                                 
9
  The specification of c is important for the upcoming discussion of temporal stability of preferences. We will explain in 
Section 4, when we discuss our experimental design and findings, how we came to assume a value of 19,8% for c. In this 
section, we will also use this specific value of c for the graphical displays. 
10 
 More specifically, the likelihood topography is created by the use of the nine gain lotteries of our experiment (see 
Section 4 for details).
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their joint likelihood distribution in a likelihood ratio (LR) test instead. The LR test measures whether the two 
samples of elicited parameter sets, one for each experimental session, come from the same population. The null 
hypothesis of the LR test is time stability; hence significance levels report the probability of a subject being 
incorrectly classified as time-instable. This probability results from a ML parameter estimation that combines 
the subject’s CEs of both sessions. As indicated before, the p-values will depend on the size of the scaling factor 
c that we use during the ML estimation procedure. The larger the error term is assumed, the more likely CE 
deviations are explained by noise rather than time-instable behavior. Thus we will defer the further discussion of 
time stability issues to Section 5 where we demonstrate the procedure based on real experimental data and de-
termine the c endogenously. Importantly, other (not Tversky/Kahneman) functional forms of PT preferences 
pose the same challenge: they come with their own likelihood topographies. As a consequence, interaction ef-
fects also play an important role when various functional specifications of PT preferences are comparatively 
tested. 
4. Experiment and Parameter Estimation 
4.1 Experimental Design 
The theoretical considerations of Section 3 are now illustrated by an experimental study in which PT parameters 
are elicited twice. To enable a test of preference stability over time, our experiment comprises two sessions with 
a time lag of one month. The first session took place in December 2007, the second in January 2008. Overall, 86 
advanced undergraduate students from the University of Münster, Germany, took part in both sessions. The 
average age of participants was 23.8 years (median: 23 years) at the time of the first session and 22% of subjects 
were female. The experiment was computer-based and instructions were provided on screen. To be brief in 
general, a substantial part of the instructions was geared towards achieving a full understanding of stating a CE 
for a two-outcome lottery. Additionally, multiple exemplary answers and their consequences (“what-if” scena-
rios) were discussed to guarantee that subjects answered according to their true preferences. Subjects were also 
encouraged to ask the experimenter for help in case they did not fully understand the instructions (we refer to 
Appendix A for the full instructions). 
In each of the two sessions, a set of 24 lotteries was presented to subjects. These were divided into 
three categories: nine gain, nine loss and six mixed lotteries.
11
 All lotteries were constructed from the same set 
of outcomes and probabilities. The outcomes were ±5€, ±20€, and ±60€, the associated probabilities 20%, 50%, 
and 80%. Each of the nine gain and loss lotteries combined one of the three outcomes with one of the three 
probabilities. The remaining probability mass was attributed to the second outcome fixed at 0€. All six mixed 
                                                 
11  Three additional gain and loss lotteries with gain/loss probabilities of 5% were removed from the dataset because the 
corresponding answers showed disproportionally high noise, probably due to rounding behavior of subjects, as CEs were 
relatively low. An inclusion of these additional lotteries, however, does not qualitatively change the results presented in 
the paper. 
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lotteries had equal chances for gains and losses. Table 2 presents an overview of all lotteries used in the experi-
ment. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
For each of the 24 lotteries, subjects were asked to state their CE. Subjects were first confronted with the gain 
lotteries, followed by the loss lotteries, and finally, the mixed ones. Within each category the lotteries were 
presented in a randomized order. The CEs had to be entered via a keyboard with a maximum of two decimal 
places (Euro-cent).
12
 Only CEs within the outcome range of a lottery were accepted. Otherwise an error message 
was displayed and subjects were prompted to re-enter their CE. 
To warrant incentive compatibility, every tenth subject received a variable payment in both experimen-
tal sessions. The group of “winners” was drawn independently for both runs. In either session the elicitation 
procedure was the second part of a larger experiment.
13
 We used the first part of both experiments to generate 
earnings of at least 60€ for all subjects before the elicitation questions. The total payment equaled the sum of the 
earnings of the first and the second part of the experiment. The gains of the first part were reduced if there was a 
loss incurred in the second part. Consequently, this linked setup allows for an incentive-compatible elicitation of 
preferences even for loss and mixed lotteries. In both sessions, the elicitation part lasted about 30 minutes in-
cluding reading the instructions. The average length of the total experiment was 50 minutes for the December 
and 60 minutes for the January session. For the payout of the elicitation part, one of the lotteries was selected 
randomly and played by applying the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) mechanism. Owing to their balanced 
structure, the expected value of the 30 lotteries equaled 0€. The variable payment for the whole experiment 
ranged from 35.26€ to 242.32€. Additionally, each participant earned a fixed payment of 4€ for the December 
and 10€ for the January session. All payment details were clearly communicated to the subjects at the beginning 
of each experimental session. 
4.2 Parameter Estimation Technique 
As explained in Section 3.3, we rely on ML estimation to determine the individual PT parameters. To meet both 
goals of this paper (illustrating our methodology and presenting initial evidence on the temporal stability of PT 
parameters), we work with two different model specifications: gains/losses only (G/L) and full. The G/L model 
is particularly suited to illustrate the methodological framework for analyzing the temporal stability of risk atti-
tudes under PT. It determines likelihoods for combinations of   and   based on the nine gain lotteries 
( 9..1i ), as well as for combinations of   and   based on their loss counterparts. This is done for all sub-
jects j and separately for session s ( 2..1s ), see Equation 5a for gain lotteries. In a second step, the loss aver-
sion parameter λ is estimated over the six mixed lotteries using the other parameters as input. This segmented 
                                                 
12  We refer to Appendix B for a sample screen layout. 
13  The first part of the December session comprised a set of investment decisions targeted at myopic loss aversion. In the 
January session, the preceding investment decisions were used to test a distribution builder-like application. 
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approach allows for a separate test of PT components on time stability, and hence, benefits the interpretability of 
results. 
The full model allows classification of subjects according to the stability of their overall decision-
making behavior over time under PT. It jointly estimates all five PT parameters ( , 
 ,  ,  , and  ) and 
includes the entire set of 24 lotteries. In contrast to the G/L model, curvature and probability weighting esti-
mates are also influenced by the responses to the mixed lotteries. The log-likelihood of Equation 5b is max-
imized with a gradient algorithm. 
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For both model specifications the error term 
i
  is assumed to be normally distributed on the stated CE scale. 
The parameter c captures the constant relation between the size of the error term and lottery i’s standard devia-
tion
14
 and is calibrated to maximize the likelihood across all subjects 
]))((max[:..1 1
2
1 ,,/,,/    
J
j s
loss
sjLG
gain
sjLG
LLLLJj .15 The resulting (optimal) factor amounts to c 0.198. Hence, we 
assume an error term sized to 19.8% of the corresponding lottery’s standard deviation. The magnitude of the 
random error has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results concerning time stability. Yet, it has no influ-
ence on the point estimates, i.e., all parameter point estimates are independent of c.  
5. Parameter Estimates and their Stability over Time 
5.1 Findings on the Group Level 
To maintain the focus of the analyses, we exclude subjects who had difficulty understanding the experimental 
task or were insufficiently motivated. This is accomplished by a pair-wise comparison of lotteries to detect first-
order stochastic dominance violations.
16
 By applying this criterion we exclude 13 of the 86 subjects, i.e., 15%. 
                                                 
14 Other weighting schemes are possible. As a robustness check, we also estimated parameters by assuming lottery-triple 
specific outcome weighted error terms. Results applying this standard error specification are very similar.  
15
  A theoretically appealing alternative to this method is represented by introducing lottery-specific error terms via an 
additional session directly after the first one, i.e. without (significant) time delay. Differences in stated CEs between 
these two sessions can only result from noise (rather than temporal instability). The standard deviation of the error term 
could thus be set equal to the standard deviation of CEs between these two sessions (pooled over all subjects). Such a 
procedure, however, implies that subjects must be confronted with three sessions in total. In order to attempt to complete 
the experimental task within acceptable bounds we applied a two-session procedure. 
16  We regard any CE answer that is strictly greater than the stated CE for a (first-order) stochastically dominating lottery as 
inconsistent. In our experiment, a stochastically dominating lottery is a lottery with an equal or higher gain probability 
and an equal or higher (non-zero) outcome, while one of these two inequalities needs to be strict. In any of the four 
scenarios (two domains, two experimental sessions), we allow for one of the nine stated CEs to be varied arbitrarily to 
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Seventy-three subjects remain in the dataset. All following analyses are based upon this restricted group. We 
also used the restricted dataset to determine the scaling factor c. Using the ML estimation technique described in 
Section 4.1 (G/L model), we calculate parameters that are within the range of related studies, see Table 3 for 
quartile results.
17
 In the gain domain our median estimates for curvature are equal to 0.99 and 1.00 for the two 
experimental sessions, indicating linearity of the value function. The interquartile range covers values between 
0.88 and 1.13 for both sessions. In the loss domain we observe  s of 0.86 in the first and 0.93 in the second 
session, indicating the typical convex shape of the value function in the loss domain.
18
 Sixty-five percent of the 
subjects in the first and 70% in the second session have   values lower than one. 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
We find subjects to conduct moderate probability weighting – slightly more pronounced in the loss domain – 
with median values of 0.86/0.87 in the gain and 0.83/0.75 in the loss domain (first/second session). Thus we 
observe slightly less pronounced median probability weighting than other studies, e.g., Abdellaoui (2000). In the 
four domain/time combinations, a fraction of 79% to 92% of subjects shows the characteristic inverse S-shaped 
probability weighting, i.e.,   values of lower than one. Median estimates for the loss aversion coefficient λ 
equal 1.46 and 1.23 for first and second session. 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Using the full model to jointly estimate all five PT parameters, the results are very similar (see Table 4). The 
majority of subjects show only marginal differences in parameter estimates: for 72% of subjects the  /  esti-
mate remains within 0.05 of the G/L model value, for   /  an even larger fraction of the differences (96%) 
remain below this threshold. The output of both models is even more alike when it comes to median estimates 
(across all subjects). Over all four curvature and probability weighting parameters, the difference in median 
estimates is at most 0.04, although the loss aversion coefficient differs by 0.14. Overall, the median (and also 
quartile) coefficients on all PT parameters are remarkably stable in both the G/L and the full model. Further-
more, our parameter estimates are comparable to previously published values.
19
 All individual full model para-
meter estimates for both experimental sessions are provided in Table 5. 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE  
                                                                                                                                                        
resolve apparent inconsistencies. If, in at least one of the four scenarios, more than one CE must be varied to relieve the 
set of nine CE answers from any inconsistency, the corresponding subject is excluded from the analyses. 
17  A comprehensive overview of the gain domain is presented by Stott (2006), Table 5. Abdellaoui et al. (2008) survey loss 
aversion (see Table 1). 
18  Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) and Abdellaoui et al. (2007) also observe the curvature to be more pronounced in the 
domain of losses. Abdellaoui et al. (2005) document just the opposite. 
19 We also classified subjects according to the stated CEs in relation to the expected value of the lotteries, a similar 
approach to the weak definition of risk aversion by Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994). The majority of subjects shows 
characteristic PT pattern, i.e., showing risk averse behavior in the gain and risk seeking behavior in the loss domain. 
Comparing these general risk attitudes between two sessions constitutes an alternative approach of measuring time 
stability. 
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5.2 Time Stability at the Individual Level  
To jointly analyze the temporal stability of value and probability weighting function parameters, we have to use 
the information about their joint likelihood distribution in a likelihood ratio (LR) test. The null hypothesis of the 
LR test is time stability; hence significance levels report the probability of a subject being incorrectly classified 
as time-instable. The numerator of the test statistic corresponds to the probability of observing the stated CEs 
under the null. This probability results from a ML parameter estimation that combines the subject’s CEs of both 
sessions to a total of 18 (G/L model). The denominator corresponds to the probability of observing the stated 
CEs under the alternative hypothesis, i.e., the likelihoods of separated parameter estimations for sessions one 
and two are multiplied. As indicated before, the p-values depend on the size of the scaling factor c determined 
during the ML estimation procedure.
20
 The larger the error term assumed, the more likely CE deviations are 
explained by noise rather than time-instable behavior. As shown in Section 4.1, we estimated the c at 19.8% of a 
lottery’s standard deviation. The use of a smaller standard error would decrease reported significance levels, i.e., 
increase the fraction of subjects classified as time-instable (for a given significance level) and vice versa. Vi-
sually speaking, a smaller standard error would increase the slope in the likelihood topographies. 
At a significance level of p=5%, 12 (27) of the 73 subjects, i.e., 16% (37%) are classified as time-
instable in the gain (loss) domain. Overall, 33 subjects (45%) are instable in at least one of the two domains. 
Individual p-values for the gain and loss domain are presented in Table 5. To illustrate the conceptual back-
ground of the analysis, Figure 4 graphs the likelihood profiles for two representative subjects, one of which is 
regarded as almost perfectly time-stable (left panel), the other as time-instable (right panel). Although the point 
estimate deviations for the two subjects are relatively similar (i.e., they show similar deviations of both   and 
 ), the judgment of time stability differs considerably.21 This can be seen by comparing the likelihood profiles 
in the upper two rows of Figure 4. All likelihood profiles show the above-described interaction effects between 
  and  . Evidently, the likelihood profiles of the subject being classified as time-instable differ substantially. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The variation distance (VD) of likelihood topographies extends the graphical approach to the measurement of 
time stability and thus represents a visualization of the LR test. It is defined as the distance between two norma-
lized likelihood profiles. For this purpose we normalize the sum of likelihoods over the entire estimation range 
( ,  from 0.2 to 2). In our analysis, the VD quantifies the relative overlap of first and second session’s pro-
files. A value of zero implies that likelihood profiles are identical, and hence indicates perfect time stability. A 
VD of one represents disjoint likelihood profiles and an absolute lack of time stability. Figures 4e and 4f show 
overlapping likelihoods as an illustration of the VD for the same two aforementioned representative subjects. 
                                                 
20
  Since the LR test statistic is only asymptotically χ2 distributed, we use a bootstrap procedure to determine the statistical 
significance of subjects’ temporal instability. For each lottery we randomly generate 10,000 normally distributed CE 
answers with means equal to the G/L model’s point estimates (pooled estimates over both sessions) and standard 
deviations equal to the standard deviation of the lottery and compute 10,000 likelihood ratios. The resulting quasi-
continuous distribution of likelihood ratios is then compared to the actual likelihood to determine the p-value. As the 
resulting distribution of likelihood ratios depends on the estimated parameters, the bootstrap procedure is to be 
conducted for each parameter combination and subject, respectively. 
21  The two examples are subjects 23 (time-instable) and 26 (time-stable), see Table 5.  
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Apparently, the subject being classified as time-stable shows much higher consistency. Her overlapping likelih-
ood greatly exceeds that of the time instable subject. The respective VDs are 37.5% for the time-stable and 
98.8% for the time-instable subject. 
The results for the full model, which classifies subjects according to the stability of their overall deci-
sion-making behavior, are very similar. According to the LR test 24, out of the 73 subjects (33%) show a tem-
poral instability (at a p-value of 5%). In other words, a third of our subjects are significantly instable PT deci-
sion makers. 
6. Conclusion 
Prior research has focused on the stability of preferences when these are characterized by single-parameter EUT 
models. Measuring the time stability of multi-parameter decision models such as (Cumulative) Prospect Theory 
(PT), where the risk attitude is determined by the shape of the value function as well as the shape of the proba-
bility weighting function and their interaction, is far more complex. We show that these interaction effects not 
only impede the elicitation of PT parameters at a single point in time (flat maxima in the estimation procedure), 
but also highlight the necessity for a holistic analysis of time stability. We present a methodological framework 
to analyze the temporal stability of preferences in a multi-parameter model that accounts for these interaction 
effects among parameters. Applying our framework, we are able to classify subjects according to the time stabil-
ity of their decision-making behavior under PT. 
In our experimental study with 86 subjects we elicit parameters within the range of related studies. We 
find the majority of participants show characteristic PT patterns, i.e., diminishing value sensitivity, loss aversion 
and an inversely S-shaped probability weighting function. Relating to time stability, our results underline that 
PT is well-suited to describe preferences on an aggregated level as we observe remarkably stable median para-
meter estimates. With regard to individual preferences, however, our study reveals that one-third of the subjects 
show significant instability over time. Two caveats apply to our experimental analysis. First, it has to be kept in 
mind that the proportion of participants being classified as time-instable depends on the size of the error term 
that accounts for noise in the individuals’ answers. Second, a time lag of one month might not be sufficiently 
large to reveal temporal instabilities. Thus, the experimental results can only provide initial evidence for tem-
poral (in)stability of PT preferences. Yet, our analysis demonstrates how the interaction effects within the PT 
parameter elicitation procedure unfold. 
An interesting field for future research will be to learn more about the reasons why we observe such 
high instability at the individual level. To discriminate more exactly between noise and temporal instability, an 
extended experimental design, featuring elicitation sessions with and without time delay, could be an effective 
means. The introduction of session delays exceeding one month represents an additional option to learn more 
about the underlying dynamics of the changes in decision-making behavior. 
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Figure 1: Compensation Curve of (α;δ+) Combinations for a Single 50/50 Lottery 
 
 
 
Figure 1 graphs the compensation curve of parameter combinations leading to the same CE as the (perfect) 
Tversky/Kahneman median decision maker’s CE [calculated with ( 
truetrue  ; )=(0.88;0.61)] for a two-outcome lottery with 
one positive and one zero outcome. The positive outcome’s probability p equals 0.5.  
Figure 2: Compensation Curves of (α;δ+) Combinations for Single Lotteries 
 
 
 
Figure 2 graphs the compensation curves of parameter combinations leading to the same CE as the Tversky/Kahneman 
median decision maker’s CE for two-outcome lotteries [calculated with ( 
truetrue  ; )=(0.88;0.61)]. The upper (i.e., non-zero) 
outcome’s probability p equals 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8, respectively. 
Figure 3: Log-Likelihood Topographies for Tversky/Kahneman Median Decision Maker 
  
Figure 3 illustrates the G/L model’s log-likelihood (LL) topography for the Tversky/Kahneman median decision maker 
( 
truetrue  ; )=(0.88;0.61), reporting his true CEs for all lotteries. The (relative) log-likelihood of all parameter combinations 
within the grid is indicated by grayscales, a lighter grayscale indicates a higher log-likelihood. Figure 3a is based on the nine 
gain lotteries of this experiment, Figure 3b features the extensive set of 28 lotteries with 9 different probabilities ranging 
from 1% to 99% used by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). For optical reasons, the profiles are cut off at a log-likelihood of -
58 (-300) in Figure 3a (3b). All values below this threshold are displayed as if they were lying exactly at this level. 
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Figure 4: Log-Likelihood Topographies for Two Representative Subjects 
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Figure 4 illustrates the G/L model’s log-likelihood (LL) topographies for two representative subjects. Figures 4a and 4b are 
based on the stated CEs of the first experimental session; Figures 4c and 4d are based on second session results. The 
resulting overlap, presented in Figures 4e and 4f, is calculated by taking the element-wise (likelihood!) minimum over both 
sessions. Please note, for optical reasons, the log-likelihood profiles (Figures 4a-4d) are cut off at -58. All values below this 
threshold are displayed as if they were lying exactly at this level. Profiles in Figures 4e and 4f are not cut off as they display 
likelihood minimums. 
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Table 1: Overview of Recent Literature on Preference Stability 
 Survey (like) Questions EUT
22
 PT 
Stability 
across 
Domains
23
 
Weber et al. (2002) 
Guiso and Paiella (2005) 
Lauriola et al. (2007) 
Nosic and Weber (2008) 
Dohmen et al. (2009) 
Wolf and Pohlman (1983) 
Eckel and Wilson (2004) 
Schechter (2007) 
Barseghyan et al. (2008) 
Camerer (1998) 
Stability 
across 
Elicitation 
Methods
24,25
 
Grable and Lytton (2001) 
Kruse and Thompson (2003) 
Anderson and Mellor (2009) 
Dohmen et al. (2009) 
 
Isaac and James (2000) 
Bleichrodt et al. (2007) 
Berg et al. (2005) 
James (2007) 
Bruner (2008) 
Deck et al. (2009) 
Morone (2009) 
Dave et al. (2010) 
Hershey and Schoemaker (1985) 
Harbaugh et al. (2007) 
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) 
Bleichrodt et al. (2007) 
Stability 
over Time 
Sahm (2007) 
Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) 
Vlaev et al. (2009) 
Malmendier and Nagel (2010) 
Wehrung et al. (1984) 
Smidts (1997) 
Harrison et al. (2005) 
Andersen et al. (2008) 
Goldstein et al. (2008) 
 
Baucells and Villasís (2010) 
Table 1 gives an overview of recent literature on preference stability along two dimensions: stability type (stability across 
domains, stability across elicitation methods, and stability over time) and measure/theory (survey questions, Expected Utility 
Theory [EUT], and Prospect Theory [PT]). 
Table 2: Overview of Lotteries in Elicitation Procedure 
Gain Lotteries          
Upper outcome + 5 € + 5 € + 5 € + 20 € + 20 € + 20 € + 60 € + 60 € + 60 € 
Probability 20 % 50 % 80 % 20 % 50 % 80 % 20 % 50 % 80 % 
Loss Lotteries          
Lower outcome – 5 € – 5 € – 5 € – 20 € – 20 € – 20 € – 60 € – 60 € – 60 € 
Probability 20 % 50 % 80 % 20 % 50 % 80 % 20 % 50 % 80 % 
Mixed Lotteries          
Upper outcome + 5 € + 5 € + 20 € + 20 € + 60 € + 60 €    
Probability 50 % 50 % 50 % 50 % 50 % 50 %    
Lower Outcome – 20 € – 60 € – 5 € – 60 € – 5 € – 20 €    
Table 2 gives an overview of the 24 risky lotteries used in the elicitation procedure grouped by type (gain, loss, and mixed). 
                                                 
22
  An extensive review of the developments in utility theory during the last decades is provided by Abdellaoui at al. (2007). 
23  This field is closely related to framing effects. One may argue that different domains by themselves will induce 
differences in reference points. Comparisons of an aggregate level can be drawn from the application of PT to different 
fields. 
24  Not across incentive levels (e.g. Camerer and Hogarth (1999), Holt and Laury (2002), Holt and Laury (2005)) or 
implementation modes (e.g. von Gaudecker at el. (2008)). 
25  For early work on the association between gain equivalences, CEs, and probability equivalences, see Bassler et al. 
(1973), Hershey et al. (1982), and Wehrung et al. (1984). 
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Table 3: Prospect Theory Parameter Estimations G/L model 
Panel A: Parameters 1
st
 Session 
         λ 
25% 0.89 0.75 0.80 0.65 0.77 
50% (median) 0.99 0.86 0.88 0.83 1.46 
75% 1.11 0.98 1.01 0.95 2.84 
Panel B: Parameters 2
nd
 Session 
         λ 
25% 0.88 0.76 0.80 0.66 0.63 
50% (median) 1.00 0.87 0.93 0.75 1.23 
75% 1.13 0.97 1.02 0.88 2.80 
Panel C: Parameters Both Session (Pooled) 
         λ 
25% 0.89 0.74 0.80 0.66 0.78 
50% (median) 0.98 0.89 0.88 0.77 1.41 
75% 1.08 0.94 1.00 0.90 2.63 
Table 3 shows quartiles of PT parameter point estimates (G/L model) of the 73 subjects for the first (Panel A), second 
(Panel B) and the combined estimation for both sessions assuming time-consistent decision making behavior (Panel C). 
 
Table 4: Prospect Theory Parameter Estimations Full Model 
Panel A: Parameters 1
st
 Session 
         λ 
25% 0.92 0.75 0.82 0.66 0.75 
50% (median) 1.00 0.86 0.91 0.82 1.42 
75% 1.12 0.98 1.04 0.95 2.62 
Panel B: Parameters 2
nd
 Session 
         λ 
25% 0.90 0.75 0.82 0.66 0.72 
50% (median) 0.99 0.86 0.93 0.74 1.37 
75% 1.13 0.97 1.03 0.89 2.41 
Panel C: Parameters Both Session (Pooled) 
         λ 
25% 0.91 0.74 0.81 0.64 0.78 
50% (median) 0.99 0.88 0.90 0.76 1.37 
75% 1.09 0.92 1.01 0.89 2.42 
Table 4 shows quartiles of PT parameter point estimates (full model) of the 73 subjects for the first (Panel A), second (Panel 
B) and the combined estimation for both sessions (Panel C). 
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Table 5: Individual Prospect Theory Preference Parameters 
 1st session  2nd session  both sessions (pooled)  time stability (G/L) 
subj. ID α δ+ β δ- λ  α δ+ β δ- λ  α δ+ β δ- λ  (bootstrapped p-value) 
median 1.00 0.86 0.91 0.82 1.42  0.99 0.86 0.93 0.74 1.37  0.99 0.88 0.90 0.76 1.37  gains losses 
1 0.94 0.71 1.05 0.58 0.75  0.85 0.74 0.59 0.69 2.54  0.89 0.72 0.82 0.61 1.40  0.922 0.007 
2 0.86 0.98 0.86 0.89 1.16  1.11 0.56 0.80 0.63 0.52  0.93 0.74 0.80 0.74 1.30  0.008 0.018 
3 1.47 1.12 0.72 0.90 11.58  1.29 1.20 0.95 0.96 1.60  1.40 1.18 0.81 0.93 5.43  0.341 0.092 
4 0.96 0.59 0.93 0.87 0.62  0.91 0.73 1.01 0.84 0.20  0.91 0.67 0.96 0.86 0.39  0.211 0.891 
5 0.92 1.07 0.84 0.93 0.76  1.49 0.83 0.92 0.66 17.16  1.11 0.92 0.84 0.79 1.95  0.000 0.157 
6 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.85 1.32  0.88 0.86 0.82 0.52 2.53  0.91 0.89 0.80 0.67 2.16  0.672 0.000 
7 0.87 0.75 1.05 0.56 0.70  0.89 0.61 1.44 0.49 0.13  0.87 0.68 1.22 0.53 0.31  0.416 0.194 
8 0.76 0.82 1.25 0.81 0.14  0.91 0.98 1.22 0.72 0.59  0.82 0.88 1.22 0.76 0.29  0.300 0.741 
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99  0.97 0.90 1.01 0.99 0.78  0.99 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.92  0.848 0.996 
10 1.03 1.01 1.11 1.00 0.85  0.92 0.98 0.79 1.09 1.57  0.97 0.99 0.93 1.02 1.19  0.909 0.104 
11 1.00 0.89 1.88 2.02 0.13  0.89 0.70 1.15 0.89 0.56  0.94 0.78 1.17 0.94 0.61  0.294 0.720 
12 1.04 0.68 0.93 0.46 2.26  1.43 2.02 0.92 0.91 2.41  0.96 0.83 0.88 0.64 1.39  0.076 0.000 
13 0.94 0.93 1.04 0.99 1.00  0.99 0.90 1.02 0.97 0.84  0.96 0.91 1.03 0.98 0.87  0.985 0.939 
14 1.08 0.72 0.89 0.78 2.06  1.24 0.77 0.73 0.66 5.49  1.16 0.74 0.81 0.71 3.32  0.530 0.050 
15 0.99 0.47 0.64 0.50 2.35  1.00 0.61 0.87 0.67 0.20  0.97 0.54 0.73 0.58 0.71  0.059 0.000 
16 1.27 0.66 0.82 0.46 11.17  0.90 0.89 0.81 0.72 0.88  1.04 0.77 0.77 0.59 2.72  0.052 0.001 
17 1.20 0.94 1.04 1.10 2.22  1.18 0.72 2.02 0.44 0.14  1.16 0.81 1.34 0.65 0.68  0.370 0.000 
18 0.83 0.94 0.83 0.88 1.02  0.90 0.83 0.87 0.90 0.91  0.86 0.88 0.85 0.89 0.94  0.818 0.977 
19 0.85 0.89 1.23 1.19 0.23  0.91 0.88 1.10 0.68 0.96  0.88 0.88 1.09 0.86 0.61  0.817 0.018 
20 1.09 0.52 0.42 0.72 5.02  1.26 0.57 0.65 0.73 24.29  1.12 0.56 0.54 0.71 8.55  0.151 0.000 
21 0.96 0.59 0.72 0.50 1.91  1.08 0.78 0.74 0.51 3.58  1.01 0.67 0.72 0.51 2.56  0.035 0.822 
22 1.14 0.84 0.85 0.74 3.67  1.58 0.51 0.89 0.48 5.06  1.27 0.66 0.83 0.61 3.99  0.015 0.003 
23 0.94 0.64 1.06 0.92 0.71  1.13 0.90 1.00 0.66 3.32  1.02 0.74 1.01 0.77 1.59  0.010 0.068 
24 0.84 0.95 0.89 0.91 0.70  0.88 0.87 1.00 0.91 0.72  0.86 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.70  0.893 0.728 
25 1.09 0.85 1.39 0.67 1.03  1.07 0.78 1.02 0.54 0.72  1.07 0.82 1.19 0.58 1.16  0.738 0.001 
26 1.27 1.16 0.86 0.73 5.45  1.09 0.95 1.08 0.78 1.19  1.17 1.04 0.96 0.76 2.66  0.729 0.117 
27 0.93 0.98 1.06 1.00 0.68  0.79 0.97 1.45 2.02 0.16  0.87 0.97 1.03 1.14 0.61  0.451 0.283 
28 1.19 0.85 0.87 0.86 2.92  0.96 0.97 0.92 0.81 2.20  1.06 0.91 0.90 0.83 2.36  0.410 0.681 
29 1.02 0.98 0.91 0.96 1.78  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.01 0.99 0.95 0.98 1.37  0.961 0.897 
30 1.50 0.52 1.14 0.31 4.13  1.36 0.75 0.80 0.56 10.94  1.41 0.62 0.87 0.45 8.17  0.074 0.007 
31 0.89 0.79 1.65 0.47 0.10  1.82 2.02 1.36 0.66 2.16  0.99 0.91 1.49 0.56 0.21  0.126 0.310 
32 1.01 0.84 1.11 0.53 0.43  0.97 0.92 1.12 0.55 0.36  0.99 0.88 1.12 0.54 0.38  0.842 0.946 
33 1.37 0.78 0.71 0.69 13.41  0.90 0.56 0.93 0.61 0.38  1.09 0.65 0.80 0.65 1.79  0.000 0.389 
34 0.91 0.95 0.91 0.95 0.99  0.93 0.94 0.87 0.90 1.29  0.92 0.95 0.89 0.92 1.13  0.992 0.933 
35 0.94 0.93 1.01 0.94 1.27  0.93 0.75 1.13 0.72 0.32  0.91 0.84 1.05 0.82 0.57  0.457 0.262 
36 0.86 0.86 2.02 1.95 0.03  0.99 1.01 1.03 0.84 2.31  0.91 0.91 1.18 0.99 0.62  0.229 0.019 
37 1.71 0.70 0.59 0.67 56.99  1.29 0.72 0.90 0.37 9.18  1.52 0.70 0.65 0.54 27.34  0.016 0.023 
38 0.97 0.96 1.04 0.99 0.85  0.87 0.86 1.06 0.70 0.63  0.92 0.90 1.03 0.82 0.77  0.597 0.189 
39 0.99 0.86 0.71 0.56 2.30  1.29 0.98 0.71 0.85 3.49  1.13 0.92 0.68 0.70 3.22  0.079 0.004 
40 0.91 0.80 0.62 0.71 4.69  0.75 0.88 0.66 0.56 1.79  0.84 0.83 0.64 0.63 3.15  0.457 0.226 
41 0.96 1.02 0.85 0.85 1.93  0.96 0.86 0.76 0.86 1.91  0.96 0.93 0.81 0.85 1.94  0.748 0.944 
42 1.16 0.72 0.80 0.63 2.11  1.23 0.87 0.63 0.92 8.01  1.19 0.79 0.70 0.76 3.94  0.212 0.162 
43 0.90 0.83 1.20 1.12 0.44  1.07 0.63 0.88 0.65 2.35  0.98 0.72 0.97 0.80 1.24  0.379 0.000 
44 1.45 1.28 0.70 0.92 16.11  2.02 1.19 0.70 0.84 48.38  1.74 1.26 0.70 0.88 28.16  0.057 0.862 
45 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  1.000 1.000 
46 1.39 0.98 0.63 0.72 15.93  1.33 0.86 0.75 0.88 8.46  1.36 0.91 0.69 0.79 11.81  0.876 0.014 
47 0.84 0.84 0.75 0.69 1.35  0.88 0.85 0.75 0.68 1.99  0.86 0.85 0.75 0.68 1.62  0.650 0.915 
48 0.43 0.49 0.90 0.41 0.54  1.35 0.62 0.83 0.37 3.99  0.89 0.50 0.92 0.37 1.12  0.000 0.406 
49 1.08 0.96 0.79 0.45 2.38  1.27 0.84 0.91 0.81 5.37  1.17 0.89 0.80 0.61 3.93  0.376 0.000 
50 1.01 0.89 0.80 0.96 2.46  1.06 1.08 1.16 0.62 1.70  1.03 0.97 0.93 0.77 2.22  0.686 0.010 
51 1.27 1.18 0.96 0.99 3.70  0.79 0.77 0.82 0.71 0.81  0.95 0.92 0.88 0.83 1.22  0.000 0.022 
52 0.92 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.90  0.82 0.90 1.28 1.16 0.22  0.87 0.91 1.05 1.00 0.50  0.843 0.040 
53 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.42  0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.90  0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 1.18  0.999 0.977 
54 0.79 0.83 1.08 1.08 0.33  0.83 0.83 0.99 0.81 0.59  0.81 0.83 1.01 0.91 0.49  0.993 0.382 
55 0.90 0.84 0.94 0.52 1.52  0.90 0.94 0.85 0.60 1.57  0.90 0.89 0.89 0.56 1.58  0.809 0.710 
56 1.18 0.63 0.73 0.74 4.43  0.75 0.99 1.03 0.77 0.23  0.94 0.78 0.84 0.76 1.23  0.017 0.010 
57 1.42 0.89 0.91 0.76 8.94  1.25 0.84 1.03 0.46 3.32  1.33 0.86 0.92 0.61 5.53  0.464 0.003 
58 1.03 0.80 0.85 0.82 2.01  1.01 0.87 0.86 0.88 1.07  1.01 0.83 0.86 0.85 1.35  0.883 0.919 
59 1.12 0.96 0.93 0.79 1.42  0.94 0.88 0.74 0.73 1.94  1.02 0.92 0.83 0.75 1.68  0.343 0.062 
60 0.76 0.75 1.02 0.84 0.59  0.88 0.57 0.99 0.85 0.47  0.81 0.65 1.00 0.84 0.56  0.180 0.977 
61 1.28 0.67 0.83 0.82 6.42  0.91 0.75 0.82 0.69 1.03  1.07 0.71 0.81 0.76 2.42  0.055 0.446 
62 0.95 0.70 0.74 0.82 2.30  0.79 0.78 0.58 0.67 2.07  0.86 0.74 0.65 0.74 2.20  0.559 0.016 
63 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.60  1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.05  1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.71  0.999 0.997 
64 0.93 0.78 0.89 0.82 0.80  1.11 0.84 0.98 0.74 1.65  1.01 0.81 0.93 0.78 1.07  0.139 0.661 
65 0.98 0.71 0.75 0.56 3.67  0.82 0.75 0.71 0.68 1.29  0.90 0.73 0.72 0.62 2.34  0.594 0.377 
66 1.08 1.02 1.05 0.95 1.16  0.94 0.94 1.07 0.92 0.64  1.01 0.98 1.06 0.93 0.86  0.558 0.986 
67 0.95 0.93 1.03 0.90 0.73  0.99 1.00 1.04 0.94 0.80  0.97 0.96 1.03 0.92 0.78  0.890 0.958 
68 1.05 0.99 0.84 1.02 1.82  1.46 1.13 0.94 0.84 9.78  1.22 1.03 0.88 0.92 3.67  0.038 0.441 
69 1.10 1.08 0.92 0.76 2.44  1.06 1.03 1.03 0.76 1.74  1.09 1.07 0.97 0.76 2.22  0.827 0.811 
70 1.23 1.04 0.78 0.62 49.53  0.82 0.81 1.01 0.89 0.50  0.98 0.90 0.85 0.73 3.17  0.002 0.001 
71 0.86 0.81 1.25 0.64 0.46  1.10 0.79 1.15 0.86 1.41  0.97 0.80 1.18 0.74 0.79  0.158 0.250 
72 1.20 0.75 0.97 0.51 2.62  1.12 0.64 0.91 0.72 1.37  1.16 0.69 0.92 0.61 1.95  0.415 0.041 
73 1.02 1.01 0.96 0.66 1.70  1.01 0.92 0.87 0.83 1.97  1.02 0.96 0.90 0.74 1.95  0.918 0.436 
Table 5 shows individual CPT parameters of 73 subjects for both experimental sessions separately and pooled (full model). 
Additionally, bootstrapped p-values for time stability in the gain and loss domain are displayed (G/L model). 
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Appendix A: Instructions (translated from German) 
 
You will now be shown the instructions for the second part of the experiment. This part will take approx. 30-40 
minutes (incl. the time necessary to read these instructions). 
In this part of the experiment 30 lotteries will be presented to you. You will be asked to state your certainty 
equivalent (CE) for each of these lotteries. The CE is the amount that leaves you exactly indifferent between that 
amount and the lottery. For lotteries with positive outcomes the CE is exactly the amount for which it does not 
matter to you whether you receive it or are allowed to take part in the lottery. For lotteries with negative out-
comes the CE is exactly the amount for which it does not matter to you whether you pay it or have to take part 
in the lottery. Let’s look at two examples for clarification. 
First example: assume that you are presented with the following gain lottery: with a probability of 50% you will 
win 50€, and with a probability of 50% you will receive nothing. You have to state your CE for this lottery. Let 
us assume you state a CE of 20€. This would imply that it does not matter to you if you receive the 20€ for sure 
or are allowed to take part in the lottery. Furthermore it would imply that:  
 For every amount of money larger than 20€, you would prefer the certain money amount. Hence, you 
would prefer receiving 21€ over being allowed to take part in the lottery.   
 For every amount of money smaller than 20€, you would prefer the lottery. Hence, you would prefer be-
ing allowed to take part in the lottery over receiving 19€.  
Please note that the 20€ mentioned above are just an example and should by no means be considered as a correct 
answer. There are no correct or false answers. Your stated CE only has to be between 0€ and 50€. Besides that, 
only your personal preferences determine your CE. 
Second example: assume that you are presented with the following loss lottery: with a probability of 50% you 
will lose 50€, and with a probability of 50% you won’t lose anything. You have to state your CE. Let us assume 
you state a CE of –30€. This would imply that it does not matter to you if you have to pay 30€ for sure or have 
to take part in the lottery. Furthermore, this would imply that: 
 For every amount of money larger than –30€ (i.e., losses smaller than 30€), you would prefer the certain 
money amount. Hence, you would prefer paying 29€ over having to take part in the lottery. 
 For every amount of money smaller than –30€ (i.e., losses larger than 30€) you would prefer the lottery. 
Hence, you would prefer having to take part in the lottery over paying 31€. 
Please note that the -30€ mentioned above are also just an example. The CE that you state only has to be be-
tween –50€ and 0€, depending on your own preferences.  
A note on negative lotteries: naturally, your CEs have to be negative. Please have this in mind when entering 
your CE (i.e., don’t forget to type the “–” in front of the number). 
At the end of the experiment’s second part, you will be presented with mixed lotteries. These are lotteries that 
will result either in a gain or a loss for you (thus, one outcome is positive, the other outcome is negative). Please 
state your CE here, too. For the mixed lotteries, the sign is very important. Therefore, please note when entering 
your CE: 
 If your CE is negative you will be indifferent between paying that amount and taking part in the lottery. 
In this case, please enter a negative value.  
 If your CE is positive you will be indifferent to either receiving that amount or taking part the lottery. 
In this case, please enter a positive value. Thus, for the mixed lotteries your CE might be positive in 
some cases and negative in others.  
You will probably have to take some time to determine which amount makes you indifferent towards a lottery. It 
is very important that you take enough time to think about your decision carefully. 
It is essential for us that you think about your decisions carefully and state your true preferences. On the one 
hand we try to draw conclusions for our research from your decisions. Hence, you support the chair and your 
department. On the other hand your monetary compensation depends on your decisions. The BDM-mechanism 
(which you already know from the first part of the experiment) will again ensure that you answer according to 
your true preferences.  
Again, the objective of the BDM-mechanism is that your stated CE matches your true CE. Stated differently: by 
applying the BDM-mechanism it cannot be beneficial for you to state a CE (for strategic or other reasons) that is 
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higher or lower than your true CE. The BDM-mechanism in this part of the experiment works as follows: a 
random number (i.e., particularly independent of your given CE) is drawn between the lower and the higher 
outcome of the lottery. When comparing this random number to your given CE two cases can be distinguished: 
 This random amount is larger than (or equal to) your stated CE. In this case, you receive the randomly 
drawn amount (not your CE!). 
 The random amount is smaller than your given CE. In this case, you will take part in the lottery. 
Please note that you cannot change your CE after the random number has been drawn. Whether you take part in 
the lottery or receive the amount depends only on whether your initially stated CE is higher or lower than the 
randomly drawn amount. On the next page you will see why this mechanism ensures that you should always 
state your true CE. 
An example shall clarify why giving your true CE is always in your best interest: Assume your true CE is 20€, 
but (for whatever reason) you stated a CE of 30€. If the randomly drawn amount is 25€ for example, you will 
take part in the lottery (because the amount is lower than your stated CE). You actually would have preferred 
receiving the 25€ over taking part in the lottery, though.  
Now assume that your true CE is 30€, but (for whatever reason) you stated a CE of only 20€. If the randomly 
drawn amount is 25€, you will receive the 25€ (because the amount is higher than your stated CE). You would 
actually have preferred taking part in the lottery over receiving “only” 25€, though. 
In both examples, random amounts lower than 20€ or higher than 30€ would not influence the situation. In these 
cases, you would not have an advantage or disadvantage, regardless of whether you answer according to your 
true preferences or not.  
These explanations are supposed to illustrate that no situation can occur in which you would have an advantage 
from stating a CE different from your true CE. To the contrary, you can only have a disadvantage (as described 
in the examples). It is therefore advisable always to state your true CE. 
All numbers given above do not represent any recommendation. They only serve as an example. Your own CEs 
depend only on your preferences and don’t even have to be close to the numbers used above (and of course 
depend on the lotteries). 
As already stated, we will draw exactly one-tenth of all experimental participants who will then receive (or 
possibly also lose) real money according to their decisions. For this purpose, one of your decisions (stated CE) 
will be chosen. It will then be determined by the BDM-mechanism whether you will receive the certain amount 
or take part in the lottery. In the latter case, the lottery will be played. This payment for the drawn participants 
will not take place before the end of the whole experiment (participants can be present). 
When making decisions please always keep in mind that you are dealing with real money and that you might 
sustain real losses in this second part of the experiment.  
If you still have any questions please don’t hesitate to ask the supervisor of the experiment. Otherwise you may 
click on “Next” to start the second part of the experiment. 
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Appendix B: Experiment Example Screen 
 
Appendix B shows an example screen as shown in the experiment (translated from German). 
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